INTRODUCTION
At first blush, major state universities and colleges appear to be well-balanced with their private counterparts: Each contains strong academic programs with Nobel Laureates and other notable scholars in their research labs and lecture halls; each fields large numbers of strong sports teams; and each benefits from the current federal intellectual property rights regime, whereby valuable patents, copyrights, and trademarks have been claimed. Despite this apparent parity, however, state universities have a surprising economic advantage over private universities-state universities can profit from their Eleventh Amendment immunity against damage claims for intellectual property infringement. Private institutions are not similarly immune.
This disparate treatment of intellectual property rights is particularly important because of several recent cases involving universities (both public and private) against private entities. Two noteworthy examples include litigation by the University of Rochester against G.D. Searle & Co. (Pharmacia) for the alleged infringement of the University's patent on the Cox-2 enzyme 1 and John Madey's claim against Duke University concerning the alleged infringement of his patents own over 2700 trademarks. 11 The monetary value of this intellectual property is realized through licensing and technology transfer arrangements, whereby a university licenses its intellectual property to another entity. In fiscal year 2002, according to the Association of University Technology Managers, public and private universities received almost one billion dollars in gross license income from their intellectual property. 12 Such lucrative licensing opportunities illustrate the increasing importance and utility of university research to private enterprise that the Bayh-Dole Act 13 was meant to foster. 14 As a result of the Act, public-private collaborations have developed and commercialized novel technologies like enhanced cellular voice quality and improved commodity products such as cleaner electricity. 15 Indeed, in this cooperative environment, it was rare for patent infringement suits to be brought against academic institutions, since most technologies were made available to academic researchers under reasonable terms-e.g., at low cost and with acceptable restrictions on use. 16 Another reason that such suits were few and far between was the parity between universities and commercial patent-holders with regard to damage remedies in infringement suits. As described by the 11 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: STATE IMMUNITY IN 
USPTO,
17 the Copyright Office, 18 congressional investigators, 19 and even the National Association of College and University Attorneys, 20 everyone shared the belief that state universities (as well as other state entities) were subject to intellectual property infringement suits and remedies. The consequence was implicit but sweeping: All intellectual property holders were assured the protection of their invention, creation, or trademark against any possible infringer, including a state university. It was widely understood that if a state entity infringed upon a patent, copyright, or trademark, the holder could seek not only injunctive but also monetary relief.
This bedrock of understanding was shaken to its core in 1999, when the Supreme Court ended its decade-long erosion of private individuals' rights against intellectual property infringement by state entities.
II. EVOLUTION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOCTRINE A. Common Law Development and Revolution
Understanding the historical development of sovereign immunity is important to any analysis of the Supreme Court's recent decisions regarding state immunity in the intellectual property regime. 21 The 17 Hearing on State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 8, at 10 (statement of Todd Dickinson, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property; Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office) (explaining that when Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act, the USPTO believed "that state instrumentalities were amenable to damage suits for violation of intellectual property on the same terms as private actors"). 18 Id. at 16 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyright, U.S. Copyright Office) (testifying that " [f] or most of our history, it has been assumed that the States enjoyed no special immunity from suits for infringement of intellectual property rights"). 19 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 11, at 24 (reporting that there have not been many cases of past state infringement because "states previously were of the opinion they could be sued for damages in federal court-a situation that no longer exists"). 20 Nat'l Ass'n of Coll. & Univ. Attorneys, Critique of Objections to S. 2031, at 1, at http://www.nacua.org/documents/2031responsetouniversities.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2004) (explaining that " [u] ntil recently, it was understood and accepted" that all states were "liable for monetary relief for infringements of federally protected intellectual property"). 21 Numerous scholars have chronicled the colorful history of sovereign immunity and its role in intellectual property. See generally Mitchell N. Berman 
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This case concerned the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 59 which required states to make specific findings before adopting laws that "substantially burden" an individual's religious practices. 60 Although the case did not deal with state immunity per se, the Court ruled that Congress could only use Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a "'remedial'" power for enforcing that Amendment's provisions. 61 The Court established a test for determining when this remedial power is properly used, holding that "[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."
62 Considering the RFRA, the Court concluded that the statute 53 517 U.S. 44 (1996) . 54 25 U.S.C. § § 2701-2721 (2000) . 55 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66 ("We feel bound to conclude that Union Gas was wrongly decided and that it should be, and now is, overruled."). 56 Id. 65 Congress had properly abrogated the State's sovereign immunity through a valid exercise of its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 66 Under the FMLA, employees may "seek both equitable relief and money damages 'against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction' . . . should that employer 'interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of' FMLA rights." 67 The Court concluded that Congress had sufficient evidence to conclude that state laws and policies regarding family leave "were applied in discriminatory ways" 68 and that states had been participating in "gender-based discrimination in the administration of leave benefits." 69 Because gender-based differentiation is subject to heightened scrutiny, the Court found that Congress was justified in passing "prophylactic § 5 legislation" 70 and that such legislation was "congruent and proportional to its remedial object." 71 Finally, in 1999, the Supreme Court articulated the last three principles of its modern sovereign immunity jurisprudence. The first principle concerned the question whether the Eleventh Amendment barred suits against the state in both federal and state courts. In Alden v. Maine, 72 the Court responded in the affirmative. There, a group of probation officers brought an action against the State of Maine for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 73 The case had been dismissed by lower courts-both federal and state-because of Maine's right to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 74 Refusing to accept the Petitioner's arguments to the contrary, the Court held that "[i]n light of history, practice, precedent, and the structure of the Constitution, we hold that the States retain immunity from private suit in their own courts, an immunity beyond the congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation." Each case concerned a tuition savings plan marketed by College Savings Bank, a New Jersey bank, for financing the costs of higher education. 78 In its original suit against Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, a state agency that administered prepayment tuition programs for Florida's public colleges and universities, the Bank alleged that the Board infringed its patent on the savings plan's financial methodology and made misstatements concerning its own savings plan. 79 The two issues were split on appeal, but the Supreme Court published both opinions on the same day.
In Florida Prepaid, the Court addressed the constitutionality of the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (PRCA). 80 Passed in 1992, the PRCA responded to Atascadero and related lower federal court decisions 81 by including an unequivocal expression of Congress's intent to abrogate immunity. 82 thus was unconstitutional. 84 First, the Court noted that the legislative record did not hold evidence of "a history of 'widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights' of the sort Congress has faced in enacting proper prophylactic Section 5 legislation."
85 Second, the provisions of the PRCA were deemed disproportionate to any behavior that Congress was trying to prevent.
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In summary, the second principle in our modern jurisprudence is the stringent proportionality test set forth in City of Boerne and Florida Prepaid to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The companion case, College Savings Bank, established the third principle of the Court's modern sovereign immunity jurisprudence. College Savings Bank signaled the death of the constructive waiver theory established in Parden.
87 Predicated on two assumptions, the constructive waiver theory required that, first, Congress unambiguously provide that a state will be stripped of its immunity if it engages in specific, federally regulated conduct and, second, that the state voluntarily elects to engage in such conduct. 88 The Court in College Savings Bank was not impressed with this theory and rejected it. 89 Ultimately, the Court dismissed the Bank's Lanham Act suit for alleged misstatements because it concluded that the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA), 90 like the PRCA, did not validly abrogate Florida's immunity, nor had Florida voluntarily waived its immunity.
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While not uncontroversial, scholars' present understanding of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is accurately summarized by Professors Mitchell Berman, Anthony Reese, and Ernest Young. They contend that the Court has deviated from the constitutional text by rewriting the Amendment to reflect the following principles: (1) that "state sovereign immunity bars suits based on federal question 84 Id. at 639, 646-48. 85 Id. at 645 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526). It is important to keep in mind that at the time of these congressional findings, the conventional understanding among the States was that they were not immune from infringement damages. See supra notes 17-20 (describing the widely held belief that states were subject to damage claims for intellectual property rights infringement). This might explain the lack of any "widespread" deprivation of rights. 86 Id. at 646. 87 527 U.S. at 680 (stating that the "constructive-waiver experiment of Parden was ill conceived" and that there was "no merit in attempting to salvage any remnant of it"). 88 In light of these decisions, two intellectual property infringement cases against state universities were vacated and eventually dismissed.
The first case, Genentech v. Regents of the University of California,
96 involved a declaratory judgment action by Genentech, a biopharmaceutical company, against the University of California. 97 Genentech asked the court to declare a University-owned patent invalid and unenforceable and, in the alternative, to declare that Genentech's own patent did not infringe on the University's. 98 On appeal, the Federal Circuit ruled that because the University chose to "enter the federal arena," had "sole control and initiative" leading up to the dispute, and "invoke [d] . . . federal law and federal judicial power for enforcement of federal property rights," it had waived its immunity. 99 The Supreme Court disagreed, vacating and remanding the case for reconsideration under College Savings Bank.
100 Eventually, the case was settled and dismissed in an unpublished opinion by the Federal Circuit. 105 Reflecting on the recent holding in Florida Prepaid, the Fifth Circuit evaluated three aspects of the CRCA to determine whether it satisfied the requirements to abrogate state sovereign immunity: "1) the nature of the injury to be remedied; 2) Congress's consideration of the adequacy of state remedies to redress the injury; and 3) the coverage of the legislation." 106 The Court found that there was an insufficient legislative record of widespread copyright infringement by the states. 107 Additionally, the Court determined that Congress had failed to consider the availability of state remedies for copyright infringement. 108 Finally, the Court noted that Congress failed to properly limit the scope of the statute. 109 Thus, in holding for the University, the Fifth Circuit invalidated the most recent law to create state accountability for intellectual property infringement. As an example of the impact of the diminished remedies, consider the story of Marc Andelman, an amateur inventor who developed a novel method of purifying water. 113 After obtaining a patent on his invention, he learned that the Department of Energy's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory was publishing work on a similar technique.
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When Andelman confronted the lab, he learned that because it had contracted with the University of California on a joint venture, Livermore and its employees enjoyed the same sovereign immunity as the state university.
115
While Andelman could pursue a claim for injunctive relief, he would be prohibited from obtaining monetary damages.
116
In response to these limited remedies, some intellectual property holders may choose to engage in strategic behavior rather than risk being shut out of monetary compensation for infringement altogether. But recent developments in the market and changes in the law have altered the dynamics of this acquisition and commercialization in such a way as to make state universities' immunity from damage suits for intellectual property infringement improper. These changes include the increasing financial importance of intellectual property for state universities, a higher reliance on courts to enforce state universities' intellectual property rights against infringement, and a tightening of the fair use and research exemptions. Notwithstanding their nonprofit status, one should not begrudge universities for trying to capitalize on a lucrative asset-their intellectual property. The commercial value of university-held patents, copyrights, and trademarks is enough to excite any university's technology transfer office. 130 Interestingly, intellectual property is a relatively new revenue generator for universities. Prior to the passage of the BayhDole Act in 1980, fewer than 250 patents per year were issued to universities. 131 In 2002, that number exceeded 3000. 132 The licensing of university-owned intellectual property has experienced a similarly remarkable increase. Between 1991 and 1999, universities' "annual invention disclosures increased 63% (to 12,324), new patents filed increased 77% (to 5,545) and new licenses and options executed increased 129% (to 3,914)."
133 Perhaps even more impressive is that nearly $1 billion in gross revenue is received by universities annually for licensing and transferring their intellectual property. 134 Multiple forces have driven this increasing emphasis on intellectual property as a revenue source for universities. Focusing on patents, Professor Rebecca Eisenberg has suggested that "[p]erhaps the simplest explanation is that the Bayh-Dole Act gave universities a 129 See supra text accompanying notes 8-16 (describing the profitable nexus between universities and private industry in intellectual property matters). 130 See infra text accompanying note 134 (noting that the annual collective value of university-owned intellectual property approaches one billion dollars revenue motive to pursue patent rights, and this revenue motive has taken on a life of its own . . . ." 135 She also has noted that although few universities profited from their intellectual property rights as of 1996, "many of them have great expectations, and they feel fully justified in using their patent rights to bring in as much revenue as they can."
136
In addition to the incentives provided by the Bayh-Dole Act, state universities have other reasons for going commercial. As Professor Peter Menell has articulated, there are at least three additional factors that have encouraged state universities to exploit their intellectual property assets: a decrease in state budget allocations for universities, a decline in the growth rate of federal funding for tertiary educational institutions, and a rising uncertainty about reliance upon all forms of government funding. 137 Driven by funding shortfalls, state universities are motivated to exploit their intellectual property.
With exploitation, however, comes litigation. While the University of Rochester 138 and Duke University 139 cases discussed in the Introduction highlight the general nature of the intellectual property infringement claims against universities, it is useful to consider the U.S. General Accounting Office's (GAO) comprehensive study of intellectual property suits against state entities.
140 Generated for the Senate Judiciary Committee, the GAO report evaluated state immunity in regard to intellectual property actions, paying particular attention to the consequences of Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank. 141 Although there were several caveats to its findings, 142 The impact of tightening the fair use and research exemption doctrines may not yet be fully appreciated, but it will undoubtedly affect both private and public universities. Fortunately for state universities, they have a safety net in the Eleventh Amendment. Even if traditional fair use and research exemptions do not protect the state universities, they can rely on their sovereign immunity to limit their exposure to monetary damages for infringement.
The resulting combination of increased commercialization, frequent litigation, reduced fair use and research exemptions, and robust Eleventh Amendment immunity gives state universities a potentially strong financial advantage over their private counterparts. Professor Mark Lemley best summarized the present situation's inherent unfairness when he complained that the sovereign immunity doctrine as applied to intellectual property is "manifestly unfair because it protects States from the rules of the market even when those States participate in the market." 154 As he correctly emphasized, in the context of intellectual property infringement, state universities are not behaving as sovereigns in the intellectual property market; they are behaving as market participants who should be held to the same standards and rules as other similarly situated participants.
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Many commentators have warned that the environment is ripe for the wholesale infringement of intellectual property rights by state entities. The Register of Copyrights has said that "logic dictates that if a infringement cases involving universities" segment of people will not be held fully accountable for certain actions, they may be less likely to restrict themselves in those actions."
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The National Association of College and University Attorneys concurs in this prediction: "Given the dramatic reduction in the checks against State infringement, it is only logical that the result will be increased but unremedied infringements." At present, remedies available to intellectual property holders include injunctive relief, state-defined relief for claims of inverse condemnation, tort, breach of license or contract, and state intellectual property law. 160 Frequently, however, these remedies are less preferable than damage awards. For example, Professor Berman points out that even when a state infringement appears to constitute a Fifth 156 Hearing on H.R. 2344, supra note 111, at 11. 157 Nat'l Ass'n of Coll. & Univ. Attorneys, supra note 20, at 1. 158 Menell, supra note 137, at 1433. Although not discussed in this Comment, increasing university participation in the commercial sphere may create an additional area of concern; private entities, which would otherwise be subject to monetary damages for infringement, may seek to collaborate with state universities so that any intellectual property infringement committed by the collaborative entity would be shielded from damage claims. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 113-16 (noting that the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory was immune from infringement-related damage claims because it collaborated with a state university in its research Because of this uncertainty, Senator Leahy has introduced S. 1191 in an attempt to close the perceived loophole in intellectual property laws created by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. This bill is not Senator Leahy's first proposal to protect intellectual property. In 1999, he introduced the Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 1999 (S. 1835). 163 The key provision of S. 1835 denied states and state instrumentalities the ability to acquire federal intellectual property rights until they opted into the federal intellectual property system. 164 Opting into that system required the state to "waive sovereign immunity from suit in Federal court in any action against the State or any instrumentality or official of that State," including state universities. 165 Although the bill was never passed, it received considerable attention from academics. 166 In general, there was widespread recognition that S. 1835's reliance on state waiver of immunity, as opposed to straight abrogation of such immunity by Congress, was a significant advantage. 167 Proponents of the bill argued that state waiver of immunity would be both superior to abrogation and more likely to survive constitutional scrutiny by the courts, 168 so long as the waiver was "voluntary and unequivocal" 169 and involved a benefit that the state would be "unable to realize . . . without Congress's prior approval." 170 S. 1835 did have some detractors. Professor Cross criticized the bill and said that it would likely fail the germaneness standard. 171 The 161 U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that "private property shall not be taken for public use, without just compensation"). 162 of S. 1835 because the use of a waiver avoids any of the "complicated requirements for abrogation" established by the Court); Bohannan, supra note 21, at 341 (presenting several arguments for why federal and state governments should be permitted to "bargain over sovereign immunity"). 168 Bohannan, supra note 21, at 304. 169 Id. 170 Id. at 325. 171 Cross, supra note 21, at 385-86. Although a complete discussion of the germaneness doctrine is not provided in this Comment, additional explanation can be found in germaneness analysis seeks a connection between the condition imposed by the legislation and the expected benefit. 172 In arguing that S. 1835 would fail a test for germaneness, Cross condemned the waiver condition as not truly connected to the benefit of abrogating immunity because " [t] he condition that [S. 1835] would place on that benefit . . . applies not to the State's own creative activity, but instead protects the creative activity of others." 173 Other scholars argued that the bill would have a significant impact on nonconsenting states. For example, Steve Malin has suggested that it might be difficult for nonconsenting states to attract preeminent researchers to their state universities because such researchers would be unable to protect their intellectual property. 174 Professor Berman identified a separate weakness of S. 1835. He noted that the penalty imposed by the bill-denial of any intellectual property rights protection-was "more severe than necessary to equalize the positions of non-waiving states and their private competitors." 175 An alternative, he suggested, would be "to grant intellectual property protection even to non-waiving states, but to limit their remedies to those that would be available in suits against them." Since the bill is still being vetted by politicians and interested parties, it is too early to know whether either of Senator Leahy's contentions will hold true.
What is clear is that both supporters and opponents of S. 1191 appear to be retrenching for a contentious mêlée. Supporters of the bill include the Copyright Office, the American Bar Association, the American Intellectual Property Law Association, the Business Software Alliance, the Intellectual Property Owners Association, the International Trademark Association, the Motion Picture Association of America, the Professional Photographers of America Association, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
186 These organizations consider the bill "carefully balanced"
187 and an example of "legislation that would as a matter of fairness and in the interest of consumer protection hold states and state entities to the same principles of law as the private sector."
188 In addition, it is likely that the bill has two strong advocates representing academic interests: the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) and the National Association of College and University Attorneys (NACUA). Both organizations have voiced support for liability for state university infringement on private intellectual property holders' rights. In its June 2002 position paper on intellectual property, the AAUP states that, contrary to the administration of many universities, it supports "this basic restoration of a level playing field to intellectual property law." 189 The NACUA echoes this sentiment by claiming that Leahy's bill will help to "restore the balance of 185 Just as the Supreme Court seems unimpressed with "abstract concerns such as fairness" 191 when it comes to sovereign immunity, opponents of S. 1191 (and its predecessors) dispute the "level playing field" argument. Leading the charge against the bill are the Association of University Technology Managers, 192 the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, 193 and the American Council on Education. 194 These opponents share a common concern that, as state entities, the bill will subject them to liability for actual damages, but, because they lack the persuasive power necessary to convince their state to waive immunity to suit, they will be precluded from receiving damages for infringement on their own intellectual property. Accordingly, they believe they will be unduly punished. 195 For such opponents, a preferred version of this bill would allow a state to make a piecemeal waiver of its immunity (e.g., waive the immunity for certain entities). and Professors Cross and Berman. There is a strong showing of germaneness between the waiver and the goal as the state's waiver of sovereign immunity triggers the possible benefit of being allowed to seek monetary relief in its own infringement suits. In addition, both the waiver and the benefit are well-aligned with Congress's goal of equalizing the relief available to state and private plaintiffs in intellectual property disputes. Finally, the bill does not overly penalize nonwaiving states or their entities. Under the bill, nonwaiving states may still obtain intellectual property rights and protection; they simply will be foreclosed from seeking monetary damages. Second, the bill injects a shot of fairness into the intellectual property system that is otherwise subject to abuse by states and their entities. Given the increasing commercialization of state universities, the subsequent litigation activity between state universities and private parties, and the narrowing of available fair use and research exemption provisions, proactive legislation is needed to ensure that state entities do not unfairly take advantage of sovereign immunity to the detriment of other intellectual property holders. An imbalanced system will create disincentives to innovate for persons like Mark Andelman, will lead to strategic behavior by private parties dealing with state entities, and may encourage further judicial activism, resulting in inconsistent interpretations of the law regarding sovereign immunity. Fairness and equity in intellectual property do matter, and Congress should consider them.
Third, Congress should adopt this bill because of its timeliness. As several commentators have warned, there is a clear danger that states may increase their infringement upon privately held intellectual property rights because of the affirmation of their immunity from monetary damages in infringement suits. S. 1191 provides a timely stopgap measure to limit state infringement. Adoption of S. 1191 would also give Congress additional time to analyze the scope and trend of intellectual property infringement by states. Should the bill's provisions prove insufficient to curb state infringement, then a more thorough analysis conducted while S. 1191 is in effect may provide sufficient justification for outright congressional abrogation of state immunity.
While these three justifications should persuade Congress to pass S. 1191 into law, there is, of course, the obvious concern that the incentive of monetary relief may not be sufficient to persuade some states to waive their immunity. It is possible that a state may decide to forego the benefits of monetary relief for the assurances of immunity from such claims. For this reason, it is critically important that state universities support the bill and encourage their legislatures to voluntarily waive their immunity.
State universities have four incentives to support S. 1191. First, and fundamentally, the proposal places no additional burdens on technology transfer offices or the researchers and creators at universities. The bill simply ensures a neutral environment for bargaining and innovating. Second, as passed, the bill will give teeth to existing university policies that prohibit infringement of private intellectual property rights.
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Without this bill, there is very little to prevent a state university researcher, instructor, or creator from infringing another person's intellectual property right. Third, unlike a piecemeal approach to waiver, a complete and broad waiver by a state of sovereign immunity from intellectual property suits will ensure a manageable and consistent environment regarding immunity. As the GAO found when analyzing the number of infringement suits involving state entities, knowing when an entity is eligible for sovereign immunity and when it is not can be a thorny endeavor. 199 By making all entities-whether privately or publicly funded-subject to liability for monetary damages in intellectual property infringement suits, the bill provides certainty to intellectual property holders that their rights will be fully protected. The fourth and final reason that state universities should support S. 1191 is the opportunity it gives them to demonstrate their influence on their state legislators. Across the board, intellectual property holders have tremendous political power. 200 Given their impressive intellectual property holdings, it is quite conceivable that state universities would have an equally tremendous impact; any argument to the contrary undermines the inherent influence that state universities possess. 201 Ultimately, the support by state universities for S. 1191 will ensure that states do not choose to sidestep this fair and needed legislation.
CONCLUSION
At a time when state universities are becoming increasingly commercialized, immunity from monetary damages is no longer appropriate. By collaborating with private entities, reaping millions of dollars in licensing revenue, and seeking monetary relief for infringement by private parties, state universities have demonstrated their desire and ability to operate similarly to private entities. Consequently, it seems unconscionable that state universities should be allowed to hide from monetary damages in infringement suits.
Nevertheless, so long as state universities are allowed to invoke Eleventh Amendment immunity to deflect monetary damages in infringement suits, there will be an injustice to both private universities and to intellectual property holders whose rights are infringed by state universities. Private universities are disadvantaged because, unlike state universities, monetary damage awards threaten their financial interests, a threat amplified by recent narrowing of the fair use and research exemption doctrines. Intellectual property holders are likewise disadvantaged because they lack access to monetary relief when state universities infringe their patents, copyrights, or trademarks.
This cabining of monetary relief is not only inequitable, it has created several additional negative consequences, including frustration and resentment among entities that remain subject to monetary damages, disincentives to innovate, strategic behavior by intellectual that property holders dealing with state entities, and judicial activism. Left unchanged, some scholars warn that state entities may actually infringe intellectual property with greater frequency since there is no financial deterrent preventing them from so doing. Indeed, given the financial value of intellectual property licensing by universities, it is easy to appreciate a state university's potential incentives to infringe when pursuing a new technology or innovation.
To redress this unfairness, Congress should enact the Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003. Unlike earlier proposals, S. 1191 gives states the choice to either waive their immunity in intellectual property suits or risk being denied monetary relief for infringement of their own state-owned intellectual property. In this way, S. 1191 avoids the obstacle of immunity abrogation, and instead, permits each state to determine whether the benefit of waiving immunity is balanced by the potential cost of monetary damages.
The Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003 is vitally necessary in this era of state university commercialization. Such legislation will help redistribute the risk of infringement back on state entities, thereby ensuring that all infringers-whether public or private-are subject to a level playing field for intellectual property rights.
